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for arbitration in both baseball and the University of Alberta cases. 
What does matter is whether the parties can expect a flip-flopping of 
awards and if this expectation is built into the negotiating strategy. If 
so, the likelihood that the parties will settle their différences without 
third-party intervention is reduced. None of Dworkin's évidence has 
refuted this proposition. 
INTERTEMPORAL COMPROMISE REVISITED: 
A REPLY 
JAMES B. DWORKIN 
Originally proposed as an «idéal» substitute for interest arbitra-
tion of the conventional variety, final offer arbitration has recently been 
the target of much criticism in académie circles.l Specifically, Profes-
sor Swimmer has postulated that final offer arbitration is subject to the 
«narcotic effect,» and more importantly, that arbitration awards will 
«flip-flop» over time as arbitrators attempt to avoid deciding for any 
party two time periods in a row.2 Rather than evaluating the compar-
ative merits of the final positions of the parties in rendering their 
décisions, Swimmer argues that arbitrators will hand down décisions 
in time period t based solely on what the award was in time period 
t-1. If true, this is clearly a serious indictment of the technique of 
final offer arbitration and of the neutrals who operate as Swimmer has 
suggested. 
The évidence that I presented in this Journal3 from the realm of 
professional baseball demonstrated that a much closer, more rigorous 
examination of the intertemporal compromise notion was necessary 
before accepting it on face validity. Professor Swimmer has taken issue 
with my remarks on the grounds that: (a) professional baseball does 
not serve as an appropriate test group; and, (b) the results from pro-
* DWORKIN, James B., Assistant Professor of Management, Krannert 
Graduate School of Management, Purdue University. 
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Vol. 16, N° 3, October 1977, pp. 306-314; Peter FEUILLE, «Final Offer Arbitration 
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pp. 533-536. 
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promise», Relations Industrielles, Vol. 32, N° 2, 1977, pp. 250-261. 
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fessional baseball support the intertemporal compromise hypothesis. 
In this reply, I would like to briefly discuss each of the points raised 
by Swimmer. 
The first contention made by Swimmer is that «Arbitration of 
baseball salaries more resembles a grievance or rights arbitration of an 
individual than arbitration of outstanding issues in a collective agree-
ment...» He argues this is so because of the relatively small average 
différence ($ 16,000)4 between the final offers of management and 
players, compared to the large différences in final positions in the 
Alberta case. Using Professor Swimmer's own estimâtes for the year 
1973, the 2.5% différence in the final positions of the parties in the 
Alberta case represents some $375,000. When one examines the per 
capita différence involved, based on 1400 faculty members at the 
University of Alberta in 1973,5 the average différence between manage-
ment and employée offers is only $267.85. But more importantly, the 
final offer arbitration system used in professional baseball is clearly 
an example of interest arbitration at work. The arbitrator does not 
interpret existing contract language as would be the case in a rights 
dispute. The fact that only one player is involved per décision does 
not change the basic nature of the dispute resolution procédure ! The 
neutrals involved in the professional baseball salary arbitration system 
are clearly resolving questions of what shall be the basic terms and 
conditions of employment.6 
Swimmer's second criticism of baseball as a test group is that, 
«Clearly none of the baseball players involved are particularly con-
cerned with the inflation rate... » He goes on to argue that an important 
part of his original scénario for intertemporal compromise was the rôle 
that inflation played in eroding worker's real wages and the real size 
of public employers' budgets. What Professor Swimmer has told us, 
in essence, is that rich people (the baseball players who used arbitra-
tion) don't care about inflation. But how does he know that (a) thèse 
players are rich, and/or (b) that they are not particularly concerned 
with inflation ? I submit that a closer look at the situation demonstrates 
that there is neither logical nor empirical support for Swimmer's con-
tentions. First, an average salary of around $35,000 per year in profes-
sional baseball is not comparable to a similar salary in private industry 
or government. Sure, there are a few players who clearly are mil-
lionaires and would be classified as rich by Swimmer and others. 
But the average player is far from being a millionaire, and more im-
portantly, his career is typically only 6 years long. After a player's 
4
 Swimmer's argument concerning the low financial stakes in professional 
baseball arbitration is even les s appealing when one considers the spillover effects 
involved when any one player is able to command a higher salary than his similarly 
situated peers. Arbitrators are specifically instructed to consider comparable baseball 
salaries in rendering their awards. 
5
 The World of Learning, 1974-75. 25th éd., London, Europa Publications 
Ltd., 1974, Vol. l ,p . 248. 6
 See Frank ELKOURI and Edna Asper ELKOURI, How Arbitration Works, 
3rd édition, Washington, D. C , The Bureau of National Affairs Inc., 1973, p. 47. 
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baseball days are over, who knows what salary or type of job he will 
hâve. Additionally, even if we make the assumption that ail players 
are rich, this would not lead us to conclude that they are unconcerned 
with the inflation rate. The notion that rich people are unconcerned 
with inflation (compared to poor people) is one that must be either 
supported or refuted empirically. Ail Professor Swimmer has provided 
us with is his undocumented opinion. And finally, if baseball players 
are so rich and unconcerned about inflation, what would explain their 
interest in negotiating cost of living adjustment provisions in their 
collective bargaining contract with the baseball clubs?7 
Turning to the baseball results, Swimmer argues that, «... they 
are relatively consistent with the concept of intertemporal compromise... 
that the probability of arbitration in one year increases when arbitra-
tion has taken place the year before. » It seems clear that there is a 
higher probability of using final offer arbitration in year t, given arbitra-
tion has been used in year t-1, than there is of using arbitration for 
the first time in year t. However, one should be a bit cautious in 
interpreting this évidence as a clear indication of the narcotic effect of 
final offer arbitration. For one thing, the newness of the technique in 
baseball and the small sample size involved should cause us to be 
sceptical about placing much weight on trends developed over a two-
year period. Secondly, if one does want to speak in terms of trends, 
a much more important comparison would be to look at the number 
of new users of the technique over time. This décline (28 as opposed 
to 8) in initial use of final offer arbitration would seem to indicate 
that the technique is performing its theoretical rôle, inducing settle-
ments at the bargaining table. Obviously, if a point is reached where 
the technique is no longer employed, there can be no intertemporal 
compromise. Finally, the players and clubs who used arbitration in 
1974 certainly don't seem to be behaving as if they expected awards 
to flip-flop over time. Remembering that the baseball collective bargain-
ing contract allows either side to demand arbitration,8 Swimmer's 
hypothesis would be that the losing players and the losing clubs in 1974 
would expect to win at arbitration in 1975 (and thus reuse arbitration). 
The actual results were that only one losing player and none of the 
losing clubs from the previous year invoked arbitration in 1975.9 How-
ever, five winning players from 1974 did choose to use arbitration again 
in 1975. Having been successful once, one might just as easily postulate 
that their reason for using arbitration again was the expectation of 
another win. If the narcotic effect is indeed important, perhaps it is 
7
 See, Basic Agreement Beîween The American League of Professional Base-
ball Clubs and The National League of Professional Baseball Clubs and Major League 
Baseball Players Association, Effective January 1, 1973, Article VI, B, (4) and VI, C, 
(4), pp. 10-11. 
8
 See Basic Agreement... op. cit. p. 6. 
9
 James B. DWORKIN, «The Impact of Final-Offer Interest Arbitration on 
Bargaining: The Case of Major League Baseball.» Proceedings of the Twenty-Ninth 
Annual Winter Meeting of the Industrial Relations Research Association, 1976, pp. 
161-169. 
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because of expectations quite différent from those suggested by Profes-
sor Swimmer. 
Swimmer's last contention is that «It doesn't matter what an 
arbitrator's motives might be. ... what does matter is whether the 
parties can expect a flip-flopping of awards and if this expectation is 
built into the negotiating strategy.» It has already been noted that it 
is quite doubtful that the participants in the baseball salary arbitration 
System were operating under such a set of expectations. Moreover, 
the real crux of Swimmer's idea is that intertemporal compromise will 
occur because arbitrators seek to minimize the risk of alienating the 
parties. I hâve already noted that if this hypothesis can be empirically 
verified, that is, if Swimmer is right, he undoubtedly will be credited 
with having a valid criticism of the final offer arbitration technique. 
However, an alternative hypothesis is that in every instance, arbitrators 
make their décisions based upon the most reasonable final position 
placed before them. That is, it is quite possible that we may observe 
awards flip-flopping over time for reasons other than those suggested 
by Swimmer. The plain fact is that the mère observance of awards 
flip-flopping over time is not ail that interesting. We need to know 
why the flip-flop occurred before we can make any statements about 
expectations of the parties and impacts upon negotiating stratégies. 
I agrée with Professor Swimmer that none of my évidence has 
refuted the simple proposition that arbitration awards might flip-flop 
over time. However, should we be content to center our empirical 
investigation on this relatively minor point? I say absolutely not! What 
Professor Swimmer really has touched upon is a much more important 
phenomenon, that of how arbitrators make their décisions. This is 
the process that we need to subject to much further empirical scrutiny. 
My suggestion of an alternative way of explaining the existence of the 
flip-flop phenomenon was presented in the hope of stimulating empirical 
work in this area. To my surprise, Swimmer seems to be advocating 
that we forget about further empirical investigation into this important 
area and instead, just let the facts speak for themselves. However, 
it is only after we hâve resolved this issue of why intertemporal com-
promise occurs (if it in fact does occur) that we can really make any 
conclusive policy statements about the impact of final offer arbitration. 
